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EXHAUSTION OF INTERNAL UNION REMEDIES AS A
PREREQUISITE TO SECTION 301 ACTIONS AGAINST
EMPLOYERS
An employee alleging an employer's breach of a collective bargaining
agreement must initially present his claim to union representatives who
decide whether to resolve the grievance through procedures established by
the labor contract.' If the union arbitrarily refuses to press the grievance,
the aggrieved worker may sue the employer under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA) .2 To obtain relief, the employee must
prove that the union failed to represent him fairly when he sought to invoke
the contractual procedures.3 Thus, the aggrieved employee often names the
union and the employer as defendants in the section 301 suit.
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),4 a majority of the
members of a bargaining unit5 may select a labor union to serve as its
I Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). An employee is not
required to use labor contract remedies where pursuit of those remedies would be futile. See
Glover v. St. Louis - S.F. Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1969) (no exhaustion of contractual
procedures necessary where conspiracy between union and employer would render such effort
futile); Battle v. Clark Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 1338, 1344-46 (7th Cir. 1978) (employee may sue
employer without resorting to labor agreement remedies where use of those remedies would
necessitate union proving its own wrongdoing).
No exhaustion is required when labor contract procedures do not exist. See Atlantic Steel
Co. v. Kitchens, 79 L.R.R.M. 2620, 2621-22 (Ga. 1972); cf. Bsharah v. Eltra Corp., 394 F.2d
502-03 (6th Cir. 1968) (despite plaintiff's allegations that grievance machinery had broken
down, exhaustion required where employer could show processing of complaints). Further,
courts do not require employees to submit to collective agreement procedures, where, though
such machinery exists, the particular dispute is not covered by the collective bargaining
agreement. See Steele v. Brewery Workers, Local 1162, 432 F. Supp. 369, 374 (N.D. Ind.
1977); Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724, 731 (W.D. Va. 1975). See also Simpson &
Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Individual Employee, 51 Tax. L. Rv.
1179, 1200-13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Simpson & Berwick]; Tobias, A Plea For the
Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned By His Union, 41 U. CN. L. REv. 55, 67-70
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Tobias].
2 LMRA or Taft-Hartley Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Section 301(a) provides
that suits for breach of collective bargaining agreements between a labor organization and
an employer may be brought in federal district court. Although state courts retain concurrent
jurisdiction for breach of contract actions that may be within the purview of § 301(a), Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962), state tribunals must apply federal labor
law in § 301 suits. See Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-03
(1962). See generally Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor Agreement
and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 514 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Tobias II]; see also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451-52 (1957)
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
A bargaining unit is a group of jobs or job classifications sharing common interests
which the union can effectively represent. See R. GoRMAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAw 66-74
(1976). Section 9(b) of the NLRA empowers the National Labor Relations Board to determine
the appropriateness of a proposed bargaining unit. NLRA section 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)
(1976). In these determinations, the Board considers such factors as the similarity in scale of
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exclusive representative.' A labor union chosen as an exclusive representa-
tive is under a duty to fairly represent all unit members. 7 The duty of fair
representation obligates the union to represent the employees without act-
ing in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner, and requires the union to act
in good faith.' This duty applies to all aspects of the collective bargaining
process, including negotiation with management,' processing of griev-
ances, 0 and representation of employees during arbitration."
earnings, employment benefits, conditions of employment, employee qualifications, the ex-
tent of integration of production processes, geographic proximity, common supervision of
labor policy, and previous history of collective bargaining. See Mallinckrodt Chem. Works,
162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1408 (1966).
1 Section 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). Under the theory of exclusive representation
by the designated union, the employer may bargain only with the majority representative and
not with individual employees or a minority union. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61-65 (1975); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332,
339 (1944). An individual employee, however, may present his particular grievance to the
employer if the issue is one of particular applicability to that individual employee, rather
than one involving bargaining on the scope of the labor contract. See Hughes Tool Co. v.
NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1945).
7 The Supreme Court initially promulgated the duty of fair representation in Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944). Relying on the exclusive representation
provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (1976), the Court found the exercise
of power to act on behalf of all employees subsumed a duty to exercise that power in their
best interests. 323 U.S. at 202. In announcing this standard the Court held that the union
must represent all bargaining unit members fairly, impartially, without hostile discrimina-
tion and in good faith, regardless of whether the employees were members of the union. Id.
at 204. Thus, the Court in Steele enjoined the railroad and union from administering a
collective bargaining agreement that discriminated against black workers ineligible for union
membership. Id. Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Cox]. See generally, Fanning, The Duty of Fair Representation, 18 B.C.
L. REv. 813 (1978); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 215 (1944).
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (union may not disre-
gard interests of minority workers by contracting for inequitable promotion provisions).
," See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 343 (1964) (union's duty of fair representation
extends to processing grievances). The Vaca Court stated that the union could not arbitrarily
ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion. 386 U.S. at 191. The
precise conduct in processing a grievance that constitutes an actionable breach, however, has
not been clearly defined. Although the inexplicable failure to make a decision on an employee
grievance has been held actionable, negligence by the union is usually not held a breach of
the fair representation duty. Compare Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310
(6th Cir. 1975) with Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231, 239 (6th Cir. 1970). See also
Barhitte v. Kroger Co., [1978] 2 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 99 L.R.R.M. 2663; Clark, The Duty
of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 Tax. L. REV. 1119, 1122-55 (1973); Note,
The Duty of Fair Representation and Exclusive Representation in Grievance Administration:
The Duty of Fair Representation, 27 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1199, 1204-08 (1976).
11 See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 572 (1976). Although the union
must act in good faith in respect to its members' interests, it nevertheless retains broad
discretion in its decisions. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964) (union free
to screen frivolous complaints which clog grievance process and take position in internal
disputes if acting upon relevant, non-arbitrary considerations); Cox, supra note 7, at 160-64.
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
When a labor union fails to act on an employee's complaint through the
contractual procedures of the labor agreement, the employee may remedy
his grievance by suing the employer under section 301 of the LMRA. In
Vaca v. Sipes, 12 the Supreme Court announced the basic principles govern-
ing section 301 actions involving issues of fair union representation. In
Vaca, a union member discharged by his employer alleged in state court
that his discharge violated the collective bargaining agreement. The em-
ployee also alleged that the union had unjustifiably failed to process his
grievance to arbitration, the final stage of the grievance procedure."
While noting the general rule that an employee must first attempt to
exhaust the contractual grievance procedures provided by the collective
bargaining agreement," the Vaca Court construed section 301 to authorize
employees to seek civil remedies without invoking existing grievance
machinery when "the union has sole power. . . to invoke the higher stages
of the grievance procedure, and. . . the employee-plaintiff has been pre-
vented from exhausting his contractual remedies by the union's wrongful
refusal to process the grievance."' 5 The Court emphasized that without
such an exception, the wronged employee would be left without a remedy. 6
Therefore, the Vaca Court held that an aggrieved employee could sue his
employer under section 301 for violation of the labor contract if the em-
ployee could prove the union violated its duty of fair representation in
processing his grievance." The Court noted that employees may name the
union as a defendant in section 301 suits to expedite their cases.'
Although employees are generally required to attempt to utilize union
remedies before suing the union for breach of its fair representation duty, 9
Thus, although the union is charged with the responsibility of serving all members' interests
equally, the collective bargaining representative may make reasonable distinctions among its
members based on important, non-discriminatory criteria. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330, 342 (1953) (labor agreement allowing employer to give special credit to veterans
in determining seniority provisions held valid); Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge v. Campbell,
337 U.S. 521, 527-29 (1949) (collective bargaining contract providing union chairman top
seniority in event of layoff does not constitute breach of union's duty).
12 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
"Id. at 173.
" Id. at 184 (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965)); see
Simpson & Berwick, supra note 1, at 1186.
11 386 U.S. at 185. See also Hubicki v. ACF Indus. Inc., 484 F.2d 519, 522 (3rd Cir. 1973);
Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231, 237 (6th Cir. 1970).
The Vaca Court carved out a second exception to the contractual exhaustion rule where
the employer's conduct constituted repudiation of the contractual procedures. 386 U.S. at
185. The Court reasoned that estoppel would operate to deny the employer the exhaustion
defense where his own conduct was inconsistent with the contract terms. Id.
26 386 U.S. at 185-86.
' Id. at 186.
"Id. at 187.
" See Winterberger v. General Teamsters Auto Drivers, 558 F.2d 923, 925-26 (9th Cir.
1977); Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 313 F.2d 318, 321 (3rd Cir. 1963); Tobias II, supra
note 2, at 531. In some jurisdictions, the union has the burden of demonstrating that union
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courts do not agree whether an employer may invoke the employee's failure
to exhaust internal union procedures as a defense in a section 301 action.2 '
Those courts dismissing suits in which a union and employer are co-
defendants for failure to exhaust internal union remedies often fail to
distinguish between use of the exhaustion defense by the union and by the
employer.' Different considerations underlie the decision whether employ-
procedures are available and adequate to redress the particular grievance at issue. See, e.g.,
Yeager v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 927, 929-30 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also Foust
v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 715-17 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct.
248 (1978). Other courts require that internal union remedies be explicitly stated by the union
constitution. See Robinson v. Marsh Plating Corp., 443 F. Supp. 811, 815 (E.D. Mich. 1978);
Emmanuel v. Omaha Carpenters Dist. Council, 422 F. Supp. 204 (D. Neb. 1976). The require-
ment that employees seek remedies within the union before instituting suit is often based on
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA). 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-
531 (1976). Section 411(a)(4) states that an employee may be required to exhaust union
procedures before suing his union, id. at § 411(a)(4)(1976), however, this provision has been
interpreted as discretionary in the federal courts. See, e.g., Verville v. International Ass'n of
Machinists, 520 F.2d 615, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1975); Beaird & Player, Exhaustion of Intra-Union
Remedies and Access to Public Tribunals Under the Landrum-Griffin Act, 26 ALA. L. Rv.
519, 529 (1974). A further policy consideration is the doctrine that private associations should
try to settle their disputes internally before resorting to litigation. See Simpson & Berwick,
supra note 1, at 1216.
Courts will not, however, require exhaustion where such an effort would be futile. See
Keene v. International Union of Operating Engr's, Local 624, 569 F.2d 1375, 1378 (5th Cir.
1978); Goclowski v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 758 (3rd Cir. 1977); cf. Sciacca
v. Wine Salesmen's Union, Local 18, 65 Lab. Cas. 11,780 (1971) (conclusory allegations of
anticipated union whitewash insufficient to establish futility of internal union procedures).
See also Dorn v. Meyers Parking System, Local No. 596, 395 F. Supp. 779, 785 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(employee not required to utilize union remedies if accompanying delay is great enough to
adversely prejudice his case). An employee who is not a member of the union is not required
to exhaust union remedies. See Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 295-96
(1st Cir. 1978) (expelled union member not bound to pursue formal union appeal procedures).
Additionally, a union may be estopped from asserting failure to exhaust union remedies where
the employee fails to utilize union procedures due to misrepresentations by union officials.
See Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758, 762 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
20 See text accompanying notes 46-49 infra. Compare Winter v. Local 639, International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp.,
466 F.2d 795, 801-03 (7th Cir. 1972) with Fizer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182, 184 (10th
Cir. 1978) and Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312, 315-18 (8th Cir. 1972).
21 See McGovern v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 447 F. Supp. 368, 372 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Foy v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 377 F.2d 243, 246 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 848
(1967). Some courts dismiss suits by stating that they have no jurisdiction until all extra-
judicial remedies are utilized. See Fingar v. Seaboard Line R.R. Co., 277 F.2d 698, 700-01
(5th Cir. 1960); Harrington v. Chrysler Corp., 303 F. Supp. 495, 497 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
One of the early cases cited for the proposition that the employer could utilize the
exhaustion of intra-union remedies defense is Bsharah v. Eltra Corp., 394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.
1968), a case involving a suit against an employer and the International United Auto Workers
Union. In a per curiam opinion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendants, basing its decision primarily on the employee's failure
to exhaust labor contract remedies. Id. at 502-03. The court did not discuss the employer's
use of the defense, stating only that it concurred with the lower court's conclusion that the
plaintff was required to exhaust intra-union remedies. Id. at 503; see Simpson & Berwick,
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ers as well as unions should be allowed the defense of failure to exhaust
internal union remedies in a section 301 action. Courts addressing the issue
of employer use of the defense of failure to exhaust internal union remedies
have followed two distinct approaches.
One view reasons that internal union remedies found in the union con-
stitution are part of a contractual relationship between an employee and
his union, and the employer thus may not avail himself of the union's
defense.2 The opposing line of cases hold that where pursuit of a union's
remedial procedures may result in reversal of the union's wrongful decision
not to process the grievance, the employee may be required to fully utilize
his union procedures before suing the employer.2
In Winter v. Local 639, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 24 the
D.C. Circuit disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the employer
was entitled to rely on an internal union remedies exhaustion defense.2
Instead, the court based its holding for the employer on a finding that the
employer did not breach the labor contract." In Winter, an employee as-
serted that his employer had violated the bargaining agreement by refusing
to award seniority on a company-wide basis, rather than on a plant-wide
basis.? The aggrieved employee also named the local union as a defendant,
contending that the union breached its duty of fair representation by not
pressing his grievance.? Winter claimed that the union based its refusal
supra note 1, at 1214-16. See also Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, 102 (3rd
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
2 See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
2 Most union constitutions provide for some type of remedy to members who have been
injured by local union decisions or actions. These remedies may include appeal procedures,
beginning with the local union membership and extending to the international convention,
which could lead to a reversal of the local union's decision. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 70-
71. However, other union constitutions may provide only for punishment of the local union
officials by prosecution for improper union action. If found guilty, the officer could be pun-
ished by fine, reprimand or suspension. See Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795,
801 (7th Cir. 1972).
The United Auto Workers constitution is often praised by courts for its extensive reme-
dial procedures. See, e.g., Fleming v. Chrysler Corp., 416 F. Supp. 1258, 1264 (E.D. Mich.
1975), affl'd, 575 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1978). The UAW constitution provides for appeal to the
local membership, then to the International Board of the union which has often reversed local
union decisions and may award monetary relief. 416 F. Supp. at 1262-63. In addition, appeal
may further be made to a Public Review Board which is completely autonomous and may
grant extensive relief to the employee. Id. at 1263-64.
24 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
1 Id. at 148.
21 Id. at 150-52.
21 Id. at 148. The labor agreement did not contain a specific provision on whether senior-
ity was to be awarded on a company-wide or plant-wide basis. Id. at 151 n.30. Industry
practice, however, was to award seniority on a plant-wide basis. Id.
n Id. at 148. In response to an earlier, similar complaint by Winter, the union partici-
pated in several meetings with the management, but had decided not to pursue the grievance.
When Winter filed his second grievance, the union again met with management representa-
tives but Winter did not attend the meeting. Id.
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to pursue his complaint on political hostility towards him.29 The union
countered that since his grievance represented a restatement of an earlier
complaint disposed of on the merits, and that since Winter had failed to
appear at an arranged meeting with management representatives," it had
justifiably refused to process his grievance.' Finding that the employee
had failed to pursue his internal union remedies, 32 the district court
granted summary judgment to both the employer and the union.3
On appeal, Winter argued that he should be excused from exhausting
internal union remedies because such an attempt would have been futile.3
Rejecting plaintiffs contention that any attempt to utilize union proce-
dures would have been fruitless under the facts presented,- the D.C. Cir-
cuit agreed that failure to exhaust the grievance procedures precluded
Winter from maintaining suit against his local union. 6
The Winter court then considered whether the exhaustion defense was
available to an employer. The majority opinion adopted the reasoning of
a Seventh Circuit case, Orphan v. Furnco Construction Corporation,3-
which had characterized the employee-union relationship as contractual
based on the union constitution and its by-laws. 38 Thus, the D.C. Circuit
Court reasoned that the internal union procedures provided by the union
constitution could not be invoked as a defense by the employer.39 The
29 Id.
" Id. Winter claimed that he did not attend the meeting because he feared that he would
lose job time. Id. The labor contract, however, provided that attendance at grievance meet-
ings was an excused absence. Id. n.2.
31 569 F.2d at 148.
32 Id. The Teamsters' constitution and by-laws provided several remedies for an ag-
grieved union member, including filing charges with a Local Executive Board. An adverse
decision at this level was appealable to a General Executive Board authorized to hear the
case de novo. An employee could also appeal directly to the International union's president.
Id. at 148-49.
3 Id. at 148.
3, Id. at 149. The plaintiff asserted that the union's inability to provide both monetary
and injunctive relief excused his failure to resort to union remedies. The Winter court con-
ceded that claimant could not have obtained monetary relief through union procedures, but
found that the possibility of injunctive relief offered by the union constitution precluded
Winter's claim of futility. Id. Winter also contended that the union's hostility towards him
would prevent him from receiving a fair hearing. The court concluded that Winter's allega-
tions of hostility fell short of the requisite showing of specific personal animus. Id. at 150.
Courts often excuse the failure to exhaust extra-judicial remedies where the plaintiff can
prove such an effort would be futile. See note 19 supra.
569 F.2d at 150.
38 Id. The Winter court relied on § 411(a)(4) of the LMRDA in requiring exhaustion
before suing the union. Id. at 148; see note 19 supra.
37 466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972).
31 569 F.2d at 150.
31 The contract approach discussed in Winter and Orphan is similar to the holding of an
earlier Eighth Circuit case, Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972). In
Petersen, two employees challenged the company's job reclassification as a breach of the labor
agreement. Id. at 314. In their § 301 action against the union and employer, the plaintiffs
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Winter court, however, recognized that Orphan had implied that the em-
ployer might use the exhaustion defense in limited circumstances."' Em-
ployees might, for example, be required to exhaust union remedies where
continued appeal could result in reversal of the union's decision not to
process the grievance. Thus, if the union appeals procedure offered a rea-
sonable expectation that the higher union tribunal would reverse the ad-
verse grievance decision and reinstate the grievance, the aggrieved em-
ployee would be required to exhaust his union remedies.', The Winter court
found that the provisions of the Teamster's constitution 2 would not result
in reversal of adverse grievance decisions, but were merely trial-type proce-
dures for prosecuting offending union officials.43 The D.C. Circuit therefore
denied the employer the exhaustion defense on the facts of the Winter
case."
Prior to Winter, several federal district courts have allowed the exhaus-
tion defense to an employee in limited circumstances. 5 These lower courts
emphasize Vaca's basic principle that an employee may sue an employer
under section 301, rather than employ grievance machinery, only when the
alleged that the union breached its duty towards them by refusing to process the grievance
past the third step of the grievance machinery of the bargaining agreement. Id. at 314-15.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court judgment for the aggrieved employees, stating that
the exhaustion of internal union remedies was a concern of the union, not the employer, and
the labor agreement contained no requirement for exhaustion of intra-union appeals. Id. at
315. The Petersen court did not elaborate on its statement denying the employer the exhaus-
tion defense nor cite any authority for its holding. The court affirmed the judgment against
both the employer and the union on the merits, also denying the union the defense of failure
to exhaust internal remedies based on grounds that such an appeal would have been futile
under the circumstances. Id. at 315-16.
The Tenth Circuit recently based a denial of.the internal union exhaustion defense on
the theory that an employer cannot avail himself of a defense arising by virtue of the union
constitution. Fizer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182, 184 (10th Cir. 1978). The Fizer court
relied on an often cited Ninth Circuit opinion, Retana v. Apartment Operators, Local 14, 453
F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972). Retana, however, did not decide the issue of employer use of the
defense of non-exhaustion of intra-union remedies, a point raised on appeal by the union. Id.
at 1027. The opinion makes passing reference to an employer's use of the defense, and can
only be construed as dicta. Id. at 1027, n.16. For a discussion of the contract approach, see
Comment, The Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies as a Prerequisite to Section 301
Actions Against Labor Unions and Employers, 55 Cm.-KE'NT L. REv. 259, 277-81 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies].
569 F.2d at 150.
" Id. at 150-51. See Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
4 See note 32 supra.
' 569 F.2d at 151. The Winter court found the Teamsters' procedures similar to those of
the Bricklayers Union, which the Orphan court had characterized as punitive in nature. See
Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
11 569 F.2d 151. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the employer,
holding that Winter's claim of breach of the labor contract presented no genuine issue of fact
for trial. Id. at 151-52.
11 See Fleming v. Chrysler Corp., 416 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd, 575 F.2d
1187 (6th Cir. 1978); Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Harring-
ton v. Chrysler Corp., 303 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
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union has breached its duty of fair representation.4 Requiring exhaustion
of all union appeals which might result in reversal of the union decision
and reinstatement of the grievance allows the union another chance to
prove its good faith, thereby eliminating plaintiff's section 301 claim. 7 The
Winter court reached an opposite result because previous cases involved
the United Auto Workers constitution, which provided a more extensive
union appellate system." Such a comprehensive system was more likely to
result in an employee securing adequate relief than the Teamsters'
punitive-type procedures in Winter and therefore, exhaustion was re-
quired. 9
Several practical reasons have been urged as justifying denial of the
internal union remedies exhaustion defense to an employer2" Employees
may often be unaware of remedies made available by the union constitu-
tion or, even if informed of their existence, may not understand highly
technical procedures." Also, most collective bargaining agreement proce-
" Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); see text accompanying notes 12-18 supra.
See Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The Brookins
court dismissed the suit against the union for plaintiff's failure to exhaust internal union
remedies and then considered whether the employer could invoke the exhaustion defense. Id.
at 567. The Brookins court identified the issue as whether the union's dismissal from the case
constituted an adjudication that the union had not yet breached its duty of fair representation
until plaintiff had pursued all remedies. If the dismissal went to the merits, and the union
did not breach its duty, then the plaintiff could not maintain a direct § 301 action against
the employer, since Vaca would allow the employer to insist that the plaintiff resort to
contractual grievance machinery. Id. at 567-68. If, however, the dismissal of the union recog-
nized that the union may have breached its duty but, procedurally, there was no judicial
remedy yet allowable, then the employee could still maintain an action against the employer
and attempt to prove union breach of duty in order to escape the employer's defense of failure
to utilize the collective bargaining agreement procedures. Id. at 568. The Brookins court
found that dismissal of the union for failure to exhaust internal remedies fell between these
two characterizations. Id. The court determined the applicable UAW procedures were ade-
quate to provide plaintiff with the requested relief and required the employee to exhaust
union remedies before suing Chrysler. Id. at 568-69. The Brookins court emphasized that
pursuit of union appellate procedures would allow the union the opportunity to reverse its
previous decision and thereby prevent any breach of its duty of fair representation. Id. at 569.
Therefore, the failure of the employee to exhaust his remedies prevents him from proving the
union has committed a breach. Id. See also O'Hern v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16,
No. 78-C-1577 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 1978) (employer may use exhaustion defense where decision
not to process grievance not final); Austin v. United States Postal Serv., No. 76-C-4681 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 28, 1978) (possibility that grievance may be prosecuted if appeal taken allows
employer to invoke exhaustion defense); Ditzler v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local
1984, 453 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Neipert v. Arthur McKee & Co., 448 F. Supp. 206
(E.D. Pa. 1978).
' 569 F.2d at 151 n.26; see note 23 supra.
4' 569 F.2d at 151 n.26.
50 See Tobias, supra note 1, at 70-72; Simpson & Berwick, supra note 1, at 1220-26;
Tobias II, supra note 2, at 529-32.
51 See Simpson & Berwick, supra note 1, at 1220; Tobias, supra note 1, at 71. Most courts
agree that ignorance of union remedies does not excuse failure to utilize them. By becoming
a union member, the employee assumes an obligation to become familiar with the union's
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
dures allow only short time periods for an employee to file a complaint. If
the aggrieved worker is required to utilize often lengthy internal proce-
dures, he may miss this time period set by the labor contract and thereby
be barred from exhausting his contractual remedies.2 Further, higher
union tribunals may be unavoidably biased in favor of local union offi-
cials53 and reluctant to reverse local decisions.5' Although these practical
factors are valid considerations, they present no convincing argument for
denying the employer the exhaustion defense since they apply with equal
force in situations where the employee sues the union and is required to
exhaust his remedies. 5
The major criticism of allowing the employer to defend a section 301
suit by asserting that the plaintiff has not pursued union remedies rests
on a contract analysis. 58 Critics emphasize that internal union procedural
requirements are rules over which the employer has no control and has not
bargained for, and, thus, he should not be allowed to avail himself of
them.57
Although the Orphan and Winter decisions utilized this contract
theory, both courts undercut the theory on policy grounds, concluding that
exhaustion may be required where internal remedies have not been fully
pursued and union procedures could result in reinstatement and continued
presentation of the grievance. Allowing the employer to defend a suit
based on a failure to exhaust under these limited circumstances is prefera-
ble to the strict application of the contract analysis. '5 Further, this result
seems more consistent with the reasoning of Vaca v. Sipes. Vaca sanc-
constitution. See Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1974); Pawlak
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 444 F. Supp. 807, 811 (M.D. Pa. 1977); Cammarata v.
Ice Cream Drivers, Local 757, 441 F. Supp. 696, 701 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd 591 F.2d 1329 (2d
Cir. 1978).
"2 See Simpson & Berwick, supra note 1, at 1220; Tobias, supra note 1, at 71. See, e.g.,
Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891 (D. Me. 1970). But cf. Pesola v. Inland Tool
& Mfg. Inc., 423 F. Supp. 30, 34 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (applicable statute of limitations tolled
during pendency of union appeals to avoid penalizing plaintiff for exhaustion of union reme-
dies).
See Tobias, supra note 1, at 71.
See id.; Tobias II, supra note 2, at 532.
Most courts require that an employee exhaust union remedies before suing his union,
reinforcing their conclusion with LMRDA § 411(a)(4); see note 19 supra.
See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
5 See Simpson & Berwick, supra note 1, at 1219-21. The authors point out that the
contract theory of the relationship between the union and its members fails when the em-
ployee is not a union member but merely a member of the bargaining unit. Id.
11 Recent Seventh Circuit cases affirm the Orphan-Winter approach. See Harrison v.
Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1278-79 (7th Cir. 1977) (employer cannot invoke intra-union
exhaustion defense since union appeal board's decision not to process the grievance was final
and not appealable). See also Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978)
(employee not required to use union appellate procedures where union no longer has power
to revive grievance).
11 See Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies, supra note 39, at 282-84.
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tioned employee actions against their employers only when the union's
arbitrary refusal to process the complaint left plaintiffs without a remedy.
If the employee is required to pursue internal union remedies, the union
may reverse its decision, reinstate the grievance and establish its good
faith thereby avoiding litigation."0 The same reasoning behind the decision
to allow a union to raise the exhaustion defense when complaints of breach
of duty to fairly represent are brought against it also applies to actions
against employers." Encouragement of extra-judicial systems of settling
disputes, recognition of crowded dockets in federal courts, judicial resist-
ance to interference with internal union affairs, and the judiciary's desire
to allow the union's highest tribunal to interpret complex constitutions and
rules all favor permitting employers to raise the defense of failure to ex-
haust union remedies.2
By requiring employees to utilize all union remedies, the judiciary ad-
vances the national labor policy in favor of arbitration . 5 This policy pro-
motes settlement of employee-employer disputes through extra-judicial
means-the use of contractual grievance machinery, voluntary settlements
and arbitration. 6 In order to effectuate this policy, employees should be
required to pursue all possible internal remedies. Since the primary objec-
tive of federal labor policy is the promotion of industrial peace through
private settlement of disputes, section 301 plaintiffs should attempt to
exhaust all internal union procedures before resorting to court action.
CHERYL I. HARRIS
"' See note 47 supra.
", See note 19 supra.
"2 See Vorenburg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies as a Condition Precedent to Ap-
peal to the Courts, 2 LAB. L.J. 487, 488 (1951).
" See Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 801-02 (7th Cir. 1972); Brookins v.
Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563, 569 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
H See LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976). Section 173(d) declares that:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the applica-
tion or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement . ...
The best expression of this policy is contained in three cases collectively referred to as the
Steelworkers' Trilogy. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 596 (1960); United States v. Warrier & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960). See also Mayer, Labor
Relations, 1961: The Steelworkers Cases Re-examined, 13 LAB. L.J. 213 (1962); Simpson &
Berwick, supra note 1, at 1183.
